目录 Preface xi 1 Introduction 1.1 Game Theory 1.2 Games and Solutions 1.3 Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium 1.4 Rational Behavior 1.5 The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations 1.6 Bounded Rationality 1.7 Terminology and Notation Notes I Strategic Games 2 Nash Equilibrium 2.1 Strategic Games 2.2 Nash Equilibrium 2.3 Examples 2.4 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium 2.5 Strictly Competitive Games 2.6 Bayesian Games：Strategic Games with Imperfect Information Notes 3 Mixed，Correlated，and Evolutionary Equilibrium 3.1 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 3.2 Interpretations of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Correlated Equilibrium 3.4 Evolutionary Equilibrium Notes 4 Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions 4.1 Rationalizabilitv 4.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated ActionS 4.3 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions Notes 5 Knowledge and Equilibrium 5.1 A Model of Knowledge 5.2 Common Knowledge 5.3 Can People Agree to Disagree? 5.4 Knowledge and Solution Concepts 5.5 The Electronic Mail Game Notes II Extensive Games with Perfect Information 6 Extensive Games with Perfect Information 6.1 Extensive Games with Perfect Information 6.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 6.3 Two Extensions of the Definition of a Game 6.4 The Interpretation of a Strategy 6.5 Two Notable Finite Horizon Games 6.6 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies Notes 7 Bargaining Games 7.1 Bargaining and Game Theory 7.2 A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers 7.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
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